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This analysis critically examines the U.S. Supreme Court’s reliance on neoliberal thought in the 
affordance of First Amendment freedoms on Internet-based media platforms.  The critique 
focuses on instances where Internet speech conflicts with traditional democratic values and how 
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n the 1997 case Reno v. ACLU, the U.S. Supreme Court shaped the future of Internet speech 
law when it determined that as a medium, the Internet functioned more like print than 
broadcast, thus giving wide latitude of protection to it.1 Twenty years later in Packingham v. 
North Carolina, the U.S. Supreme Court has again weighed in on the parameters of free speech 
protection on the Internet and again offers far-reaching, almost absolutist protection of speech.2 
In this article, I argue that much as it did 20 years ago, the Court has failed to adequately assess 
the power of the Internet in the United States (this time by likening it to a public park). I place 
my analysis of the Packingham ruling within the larger context of Internet speech issues and 
conclude that the Court went too far in its ruling, offering what seems to give unfettered power to 
social media outlets such as Facebook and Twitter to determine what speech should be free and 
what can be restricted and when. This approach to Internet speech runs counter to traditional 
democratic values, downplays the social harms caused by certain types of internet speech (such 
as hate speech, cyberbullying, revenge porn, etc.), ignores the significance of recent political 
incidents (such as the election tampering through ad placement on Facebook) and endows 
corporations with unfettered discretion over content decisions. 
 
This article uses Packingham to highlight the problematic implications of the Supreme Court’s 
reliance on neoliberal thought and its lack of understanding of the corporate nature and societal 
power of the Internet. As described by Communication Scholar Victor Pickard, neoliberalism 
works in support of “laissez fair capitalism, whereby markets are expected to govern all sectors 
of society, and government intervention not in line with commercial interests is viewed as 
inherently suspect.”3  Neoliberalism can be understood as “not simply an economic framework 
but an overarching political reality.”4 It functions as a “mode of government which consumes 
freedom, and to do so, it must first produce and organize it.”5 In this article, I explore how First 
Amendment rulings by the U.S. Supreme Court serve as a space where this production and 
organization is managed and perpetuated. To that end, this article first briefly reviews Reno and 
its implications in today’s social media climate. It then describes the Court’s opinion in 
Packingham, offering a critique of the ruling with an emphasis on its adherence to ill-fitting First 
Amendment tests and neoliberal thought.    
 
The First Amendment and the Internet 
 
The first Supreme Court case to look at the relationship between the First Amendment and the 
internet was Reno v. ACLU. In 1997 in Reno, the Court reviewed the Communication Decency 
Act, examining the issue of whether the indecency provision and the patently offensive provision 
in the CDA were unconstitutional under the free speech clause in the First Amendment. In order 
to address that question, the Court first had to determine what type of medium the Internet 
should be treated as. In what the New York Times at the time hailed as “as messy a product as 
the court has brought forth in years,” Justice Steven’s majority opinion focused not on the 
 
1 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
2 Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017). 
3 Victor Pickard, “Neoliberal Visions and Revisions in Global Communications Policy From NWICO to WSIS,” Journal of 
Communication Inquiry 31 (2007): 121. 
4 Luke Winslow, Alec Baker and Charles Goehring, “The Neoliberal Conquest of the Supreme Court,” Communication and the 
Public 3 (2018): 205. 
5 Maurizio Lazzarato, “Neoliberalism in action: Inequality, Insecurity and the Reconstruction of the Social,” Theory, Culture & 
Society 26 (2009):120. 
I 
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indecency cases regarding minors, but instead on determining whether or not the Internet should 
be treated more like broadcast or more like print. The majority found that the Internet did not 
have the qualities of broadcast – there was no scarcity of frequencies and the Internet was as not 
invasive as radio and television.6 As a result, the Court applied strict scrutiny and struck down 
both of the CDA provisions in question, finding them to be content-based and overly broad.7 In 
its dicta, the Court noted at the time that “the growth of the internet has been and continues to be 
phenomenal.”8 Despite this recognition, the Court did not attempt to address the more subtle 
differences between the Internet and existing communication mediums. 
 
Several scholars, myself included, have argued that the Reno ruling was out of touch with the 
power of the internet.9 Broadly speaking, there were two serious problems with the Court’s 
failure to think more complexly about the Internet. First, the Court’s focus on the either/or 
approach to how to define the internet – it is either like broadcast or like print – left no need to 
discuss a third option – it is neither. As a result, the Court applied standards that arguably do not 
account for the way in which the Internet actually operates. Secondly, the Court’s reliance on a 
hackneyed exultation of the need for unfettered free speech did not allow for a more nuanced 
critique of the possible detrimental impacts. As a result of this lack of precision by the Supreme 
Court, lower courts have struggled to make sense of the parameters of free speech protection in 
relation to Internet speech. 
 
Following Reno, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled on relatively few cases involving questions 
about Internet content despite the fact that Internet usage has continued to grow exponentially 
since 1997. For example, in the mid to late 1990s, less than one percent of the world population 
had an Internet connection.10 As of June 2018, that number is approximately 55 percent.11 In 
2015, according to the U.S. Census Bureau, 78 percent of all households had a desktop or laptop, 
75 percent had a handheld computer (such as a smartphone) and 77 percent had a broadband 
internet subscription.12 Overall, 62 percent of American households reached the status of “high 
connectivity,” meaning they had three key computer and internet items.13 Perhaps even more 
important are the number of people participating on social media sites. In 2016, 185 million 
 
6 Reno, 870. 
7 Strict scrutiny is a legal standard used to evaluate the constitutionality of government discrimination. In First Amendment 
analysis, content-based restrictions are only permitted in very limited circumstances and laws must not burden more speech 
(be overly broad) than necessary to meet the government’s proven need. 
8 Reno, 885. 
9 For example, see Stephen J. Shapiro, “One and the Same: How Internet Non-Regulation Undermines the Rationales Used to 
Support Broadcast Regulation Fall,” Media Law & Policy 8 (1999): 1 (arguing that the Internet should be regulated like 
broadcast media); Vickie S. Byrd , “Reno v. ACLU – A Lesson in Juridical Impropriety Winter,” Howard Law Journal 42 (1999): 365 
(finding that the technology, not constitutional principles, drove the Court’s decision in Reno); Debra M. Keiser, “Regulating the 
Internet: A Critique of Reno v. ACLU,” Albany Law Review 62 (1998): 769 (claiming the Court misclassified the medium of the 
Internet); and Louis John Seminski, Jr., “Tinkering with Student Free Speech: The Internet and the Need for a New Standard,” 
Rutgers Law Journal 33 (2001): 165 (critiquing the Court for not giving a more extensive review of the way in which Internet 
operates). 
10 “Internet Users,” Internet Live Stats, accessed December 6, 2017,  http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users/. 
11 “World Stats,” Internet World Stats, accessed December 12, 2018 http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.html. 
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Americans used social media. That number is predicted to reach 200 million by 2020.14 
According to the Pew Center, seven in ten Americans use social media sites.15  The Pew Center 
in a recent study found that 69 percent of Americans are using at least one social media site, a 
considerably higher number than the five percent from 2005.16 This percentage increases 
depending on age. Ninety-five percent of teens report having a smart phone and of that group, 45 
percent say they are online almost constantly.17 
 
This increased reliance on social media in everyday life, coupled with the Supreme Court’s 
relative silence on the matter, has led to a proliferation of tensions concerning where, when and 
who should be responsible for monitoring possible problematic speech on the Internet, such as 
hate speech, cyberstalking, fake news, and obscenity. For much of the first decade following 
Reno, the Supreme Court would focus most of its attention on cases dealing with internet 
pornography, and would do so primarily in reaction to an onslaught of congressional acts 
intended to protect children from sexual images and content on the Internet.18 Immediately 
following the ruling in Reno, Congress would fashion multiple federal laws attempting to 
sidestep the First Amendment concerns. The first of these legislative attempts was the Child On-
Line Protection Act (COPA) in 1998 which spawned three U.S. Supreme Court rulings and was 
finally resolved in 2004 when the Court ruled 5 to 4 that COPA failed the strict scrutiny analysis 
by not offering the least restrictive means available.19 In short, the First Amendment has served 
as a barrier for most of those laws protecting children with few exceptions, including Congress’ 
most recent legislation on the topic, the PROTECT ACT, which focused on restricting the 
sharing of images depicting sexual acts with minors.20 In 2008, the Court ruled to uphold the 
PROTECT Act in U.S. v. Williams, distinguishing that Act from similar previous attempts to 
restrict child pornography online because the law prohibited the proposal to distribute “rather 
than targeting the underlying material.”21  
 
In addition to the stream of Internet pornography cases, courts have considered other speech-
related issues as well such as employee rights, broadband classification, academic freedom, and 
privacy. For example, since the early 2000s, the FCC and the lower courts have addressed the 
question of net neutrality with most those battles focused on what level of authority the FCC has 
in setting the rules for Internet service providers.22 The lower courts also have weighed in on the 
issue of government officials restricting posting on their sites. In Knight First Amendment Inst. at 
Columbia Univ. v. Trump, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals found that President Trump’s 
 
14 Katie Miller, “Constitutional Law – Sex Offenses and Free Speech: Constitutionality of Ban on Sex Offenders’ Use of Social 
Media: Impact on States with Similar Restrictions,” North Dakota Law Review 93 (2018): 135. 
15 “Social Media Fact Sheet,” Pew Research Center, accessed December 12, 2018 http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-
sheet/social-media. 
16 Ibid. 
17 “Teens, Social Media & Technology 2018,” Pew Research Center, accessed December 12, 2018  
http://www.pewinternet.org/2018/05/31/teens-social-media-technology-2018/. 
18 Brian G. Slocum, “Virtual Child Pornography: Does it Mean the End of the Child Pornography Exception to the First 
Amendment,” Alabama Law Journal of Science and Technology 14 (2004): 639. (“From its inception, child pornography law has 
attempted to reconcile two powerful interests: the First Amendment and the prevention of sexual exploitation of children.”) 
19 47 USCS 231 (2004). (prohibited “commercial websites from knowingly transmitting to minors (under the age of 17) material 
that is harmful to minors”). 
20 United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008). 
21 Ibid, 293. Scalia also cautioned, though, that the ruling not be read to cover abstract advocacy of illegal ideas. 
22 See, Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 644 (2010), Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014), and United States Telecom 
Ass’n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554 (2016). 
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Twitter account constituted a public forum and, as such, he was practicing viewpoint-based 
restrictions when he blocked certain users from accessing the account.23 Similar cases have been 
heard at the lower court level, but none of have made their way to the Supreme Court yet. One 
recent Supreme Court ruling of significance is a non-Internet case, Manhattan Community 
Access Corp. v. Halleck, where the Court found that private operators of public access stations 
should not be considered state actors and so are not held liable under the state action doctrine.24 
The implications for social media providers such as Facebook seem direct and clear. Those 
social media providers occupy a similar space to the private operations of broadcast stations and 
so likely would be treated the same. However, the Court in Halleck did not directly address the 
implications for the internet. Only the Supreme Court’s ruling in Packingham has revisited the 
legal questions raised in Reno. As one legal scholar noted recently, the law to date has been 
“inept at keeping up technological advances ...”25 The remainder of this article focuses on the 
Packingham ruling, finding that it illustrates the lack of sophistication being practiced by the 
Court in assessing the Internet. 
 
The Packingham Ruling 
 
In 2017, the Supreme Court delivered a key ruling in the area of Internet speech.26 At issue in 
Packingham v. North Carolina was a 2008 North Carolina law that made it a felony for a 
registered sex offender “to access a commercial social networking Web site where the sex 
offender knows that the site permits minor children to become members or to create or maintain 
personal Web pages.” The Court of Appeals of North Carolina struck down the statute on First 
Amendment grounds. The appeals court found that the law was not narrowly tailored to meet the 
state’s legitimate interest in protecting minors from sexual abuse.27 The North Carolina Supreme 
Court, on the other hand, reversed the appeals court decision, finding the statute “constitutional 
in all respects.”28 The state supreme court argued that there were alternative means of 
communication available to those registered sex offenders and that the law was “carefully 
tailored…to prohibit registered sex offenders from accessing only those Web sites that allow 
them the opportunity to gather information about minors.”29 Two justices dissented, stating that 
the  law “creates a criminal prohibition of alarming breadth.”30 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled unanimously that the law violated the First Amendment because it 
was not narrowly tailored; however, there was disagreement on how sweeping the First 
Amendment protections should be in relation to internet speech. Writing for the majority, Justice 
Kennedy started his opinion by pointing out the historic significance of having access to public 
spaces to speak:  
 
23 928 F.3d 226 (2019). 
24 139 S.Ct. 1921, 1926 (2019). “To draw the line between governmental and private, this Court applies what is known as the 
state-action doctrine. Under that doctrine, as relevant here, a private entity may be considered a state actor when it exercises a 
function ‘traditionally exclusively reserved to the State.’” 
25 Ashley Barton, “Oh Snap!: whether Snapchat Images Quality as ‘Fighting Words’ under Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire and how 
to address Americans’ Evolving Means of Communication,” Wake Forest Law Review 52 (2017): 1300. 
26 Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017). 
27 Ibid. 
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A fundamental principle of the First Amendment is that all persons have access to places 
where they can speak and listen, and then, after reflection, speak and listen once more. 
The Court has sought to protect the right speak in this spatial context. A basic rule, for 
example, is that a street or park is a quintessential forum for the exercise of First 
amendment rights. Even in the modern era, these places are still essential venues for 
public gatherings to celebrate some views, to protest others, or simply to learn and 
inquire.31  
 
He asserted that the most important place for the exchange of ideas today is “the vast democratic 
forums of the Internet and social media in particular.”32 He labeled the internet “the modern 
public square,” equating it with traditional public forums such as streets or parks where speech 
has historically been granted the highest protection.33  Relying on language from Reno, he 
explained that today cyberspace is one of  “the most important places for the exchange of 
views.”34 In short, despite the majority’s warning that this case required the Court to “exercise 
extreme caution” in assessing the parameters of speech protection in this medium, the majority 
would assign the internet the highest level of protection previously afforded only to physical 
public forums. 
 
In the concurring opinion, Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas, 
took the majority to task for its “undisciplined dicta.”35 The concurring justices explained: “The 
Court is unable to resist musings that seem to equate the entirety of the internet with public 
streets and parks. And, this language is bound to be interpreted by some to mean that the States 
are largely powerless to restrict even the most dangerous sexual predators from visiting any 
internet sites…”36 Alito explicitly warned of the comparison being made by the majority 
between the cyber world and the physical world. He advised that, “The Court should be more 
attentive to the implications of its rhetoric for, contrary to the Court’s suggestion, there are 
important differences between cyberspace and the physical world.”37 Given that this case is so 
recent, it is impossible to determine the overall implications that it will have for future speech 
restrictions on the internet.38 However, the concurring justices raised concerns that this could 
stifle states’ abilities to construct laws to protect against dangerous sex offenders.  
 
While sex offenders’ access to children through social media platforms is an important issue, the 
focus of this article is examining the broader implications raised by the sweeping language used 
by the Court in proclaiming social media space to be the same as a public park. I am concerned 
that the Court took this expansive view despite Justice Kennedy’s own acknowledgement of the 
need for careful consideration; despite the fears raised by the concurring opinion that the 
sweeping language in the majority opinion could cause confusion at the lower court level; and 
 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid.  
33 Ibid, 1737. 
34 Ibid, 1735. 
35 Ibid, 1738. 
36 Ibid.  
37 Ibid, 1743. 
38 As of October 2019, the ruling in Packingham was cited in 112 lower court cases, followed in 24 cases, distinguished from the 
fact patterns in 49 cases, and mentioned in 24 cases. 
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despite concerns raised by Justice Kagan during oral arguments that the law needs to catch up 




Since the ruling, scholars have raised a myriad of concerns about the possible long-term effects 
of the case. For example, Richard Hasen in his review of what he terms “cheap speech” critiqued 
the majority opinion, noting: “Loose optimistic dicta in Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion for 
the Court in 2017s Packingham v. North Carolina case also may have unintended consequences 
with its infinitely capacious language about FA [First Amendment] protection for social 
media.”40 He would go on to assert that the ruling “raises concerns about how excessively broad 
readings of the First Amendment application to social media might harm democracy-enhancing 
efforts.”41 An article in Harvard Law Review took an even more critical stance, warning “[B]ut 
Packingham’s expansive language – particularly its framing of the internet as a public space – 
opened a Pandora’s box, with repercussions for certain First Amendment precepts.”42 That 
author found the reasoning in the case to be “crucially incomplete” by failing to address 
questions around the unique public/private nature of social media.43 Approximately 100 lower 
court cases have referenced the Packingham ruling with those cases focusing on applying the 
Court’s expansive language to a variety of areas including government-sponsored pages, 
anonymous on-line speech, juvenile parole conditions and terms of service agreements.44  
 
My critique of the Packingham ruling will focus on three distinct but related problems: (1) how 
application of public forum doctrine is increasingly problematic both in its standard (non-
Internet) usage and in its more recent articulation in Internet cases; (2) how social media spaces 
are not actually a public forum at all, but are instead commercial spaces owned and operated by 
large corporations, and (3) connected to the previous point, how the Packingham ruling is adding 
to a body of law that is giving increasing control to the corporate sector to decide which speech 






39 U.S. Supreme Court. “Oral Arguments – Packingham v. North Carolina.” U.S. Supreme Court, accessed January 10, 2019 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2016/15-1194_0861.pdf. 
40 Richard L. Hasen, “Cheap Speech and What It Has Done (to American Democracy),” First Amendment Law Review 16 (2017): 
202. 
41 Ibid, 223. 
42 Reporter Note. “The Supreme Court 2016 Term. Leading Case: Constitutional Law: First Amendment – Freedom of Speech – 
Public Forum Doctrine – Packingham v. North Carolina,” Harvard Law Review 131 (2017): 233. 
43 In addition, scholars have started to question the application of Packingham in other on-line related speech areas. For 
example, see Eric Emanuelson Jr., “Fake Left, Fake Right: Promoting an Informed Public in the Era of Alternative Facts,” 
Administrative Law Review 70 (2018): 209 (discussing impact on possible restrictions on fake news) and Katherine A. Ferry, 
“Reviewing the Impact of the Supreme Court’s Interpretation of ‘Social Media’ as Applied to Off-Campus Student Speech,” 
Loyola University of Chicago Law Journal 49 (2018): 717 (reviewing how Packingham might be applied to student speech in the 
public school setting). 
44 These cases include Knight First Amendment Inst. At Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. sup. 3d 541 (2018); Davison v. Loudoun 
City Bd. of Supervisors, No. 1:16cv932, 2017 WL 3158389 (E.D. Va. July 25, 2017); Hargis v. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d 1003 (2018); 
DeAngelis v. Protective Parents Coal., 556 S.W. 836 (2018); In re L.O., 27 Cal. App. 5th 706 (2018); People v. J. Lavon T., 2018 IL 
App (1st) 180228 (2018); and Sandvig v. Sessions, 315 F. Supp. 3d 1 (2018). 
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Problem #1: An already-flawed Doctrine 
 
In Packingham, the Court invoked the public forum doctrine. Before discussing the problems 
associated with this application, a brief overview of the development of public forum doctrine in 
First Amendment cases is necessary. Public forum doctrine has its origins in the case Hague v. 
Committee for Industrial Organization, a case in which the Court concluded for the first time 
that a right existed for the public to use government property for speech purposes.45 In an oft 
cited plurality opinion, Justice Roberts wrote:  
 
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in 
trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of 
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. 
Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the 
privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.46 
 
In other words, speech occurring in those types of spaces should warrant the highest level of 
First Amendment protection. In the 1960s, renowned constitutional law scholar Harry Kalven 
coined the phrase “public forum doctrine” to describe this area of analysis.47 During that same 
time period, the Warren Court would give shape to the doctrine, developing four discrete 
categories of public forum and creating a time, place and manner test to determine when speech 
could legally be restricted in those forums. Generally speaking, the four types of forums are 
categorized as traditional, designated, limited or nonpublic (private).48 The traditional public 
forum category includes streets, parks and other public spaces that constitute “an important 
facility for public discussion and political processes” and, as such, those spaces are the most 
highly protected speech locations.49 In 1941, the Court found that speech restrictions within 
those types of spaces can be based only on reasonable time, place or manner restrictions.50 Over 
the course of the next several decades, the Court would flesh out the different forum categories 
and develop a test for determining the constitutional validity of speech restrictions within those 
spaces.51 One of the primary keys to determining the level of restriction allowed is whether the 
space in question is publicly-owned or privately owned. Speech in privately-owned spaces is 
controlled by the owner of that space and so the content-neutral rules that the government abides 
by are not in play in those locations. 
 
While a substantial amount of case law has dealt with establishing the criteria, tests, and 
exceptions, public forum doctrine in application is riddled with contradictions and complications. 
 
45 307 U.S. 496 (1939). 
46 Ibid, 515. 
47 Harry Kalven. “The concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana,” Supreme Court Review 1 (1965):1. 
48 For a discussion of the types of formats, see Alysha L. Bohanon, “Tweeting the Police: Balancing Free Speech and Decency on 
Government-Sponsored Social Media Pages,” Minnesota Law Review 101 (2016): 347-351. 
49 Kalven, “Cox,” at 11-12. 
50 Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941). 
51 Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974); Southeastern 
Promotions Ltd. V. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1975); Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 
U.S. 74 (1980); Carry v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983); 
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989); Int’l 
Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992); United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003); 
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum 129 S.Ct. 1125 (2009). 
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Legal scholar Aaron Caplan likened its development to kudzu, an “invasive, creeping vine that 
covers much of the American south,” because of how over the decades it has spread from 
“explaining why the government cannot engage in prior restraint or content discrimination with 
regard to speaking, picketing, or leafleting on city parks and sidewalks” and is now “taking root 
in such disparate locations as inter-office mailboxes, government publications, specialty license 
plates, and television broadcasts.”52 In addition to its sprawling nature, there is also increasing 
confusion over the number of discrete types of forums – are there three or four – and how to 
define the types of forums – for example, what is the difference between a designated public 
forum and a limited public forum?53 He notes, “It is a bad sign if the doctrine is so confused that 
reasonable observers cannot even agree on how many categories of forum exist.”54 This 
confusion is not merely academic but has led to indiscriminate application at the lower court 
level, leading one scholar to consider the entire doctrine “unworkable in practice.”55 
 
In addition, some are raising concerns that public forum doctrine application is increasingly 
limiting access for citizens to speak on public property. For example, law scholar Ronald 
Krotoszynski, wrote in regard to public speaking areas: “Today, the baseline has shifted – and 
shifted rather dramatically. Would-be speakers are largely limited to using property of the 
government’s own choosing for their speech activity – and must do so at a time when the 
government deems it convenient to make the property available for speech activity.”56 He 
explains that while the Warren Court (1953 to 1969) protected vast amounts of space for free 
speech, today that space is increasingly smaller.57 Communication law scholar Laura Stein levied 
similar concerns about the extent of government control over speech through the application of 
public forum doctrine. She argued that while the doctrine started as a way to ensure open 
dialogue, “current public forum law negates the public’s speech rights in public spaces.”58 Stein 
focused her analysis on the 2003 U.S. v. American Library Association, a Supreme Court ruling 
concerning filtering software in publicly funded libraries.59 The ALA case focused on a 
regulation in the Child Internet Protection Act that required libraries to use filtering software in 
order to be eligible for certain government funding. The ALA felt that the requirement 
constituted a prior restraint on speech and violated public forum standards. The Court disagreed, 
finding instead that Internet access in public libraries did not constitute a traditional public 
forum. Ultimately, Stein called for a reformulation of the law that would enable it to be 
applicable to the Internet and protect speech rights for citizens in public spaces. 
 
 
52 Aaron Caplan, “Invasion of the Public Forum Doctrine,” Willamette Law Review, 46 (2010): 647. 
53 Ibid, 654. 
54 Ibid, 653-654. 
55 Suzanne Stone Montgomery, “When the Klan Adopts-a-Highway: The Weaknesses of the Public Forum Doctrine Exposed,” 
Washington University Law Review 77 (1999): 558. “While the Court has explicitly described the limits a government may place 
on speech in each type of forum, the Court has offered lower courts virtually no guidance in determining what analysis applies 
to any given location. The courts do not know whether to define the location scrutinized broadly or narrowly. Therefore, they 
do so indiscriminately, based, at least in part, on the decision they wish to reach.” 
56 Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., “Our Shrinking First Amendment: On the Growing Problem of Reduced Access to Public Property 
for Speech Activity and Some Suggestions for a Better Way Forward,” Ohio State Law Journal 78 (2017): 786-787. 
57 Ibid, 789. 
58 Laura Stein, “Censoring Speech in Public Space: United States v. American Library Association and The Negation of Public’s 
Speech Rights Online,” International Communication Association Annual Meeting (2006): top three paper. 
59 539 U.S. 194 (2003).  
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Applying public forum doctrine to the Internet raises several concerns, concerns that were not 
addressed whatsoever by the majority opinion in Packingham. For example, Packingham’s 
reliance on the public/private distinction in assessing whether or not the Internet is a public 
forum for First Amendment purposes creates a false dichotomy that ignores the possibility of 
social media sites being situated in an entirely different arena. Legal Scholar Jonathan Peters 
discussed this point in his 2017 article “The ‘Sovereigns of Cyberspace’ and State Action,” 
finding that this type of categorization “provides an artificially clear line that can minimize the 
merits of competing rights.”60 In other words, the reliance on the public/private distinction fails 
to take into account other multitude of factors that need to be addressed in each specific case. As 
Peters notes, this issue is further complicated when considering the internet because “so much 
speech of public concern occurs in privately owned spaces like Facebook and YouTube.”61 Two 
other concerns in relation to application of public forum doctrine to the Internet include (1) the 
doctrine’s reliance on a specific  understanding of a common physical space between where the 
speech is spoken and where it is heard and (2) the courts seemingly ad hoc assessment of 
determining which speech is protected and which isn’t.62 The critiques of public forum doctrine 
application, both in general and in relation to the Internet, serve as guiding criteria in assessing 
the ruling in Packingham. Specifically, those previous critiques introduce questions concerning 
the spatial component of the doctrine and the public/private space divide. Following, I address 
how Packingham, by ignoring those concerns, has created an even greater problem for internet 
speech. 
 
One significant element ignored by the majority opinion in Packingham is that public forum 
doctrine is a spatial-based analysis with time, place and manner restrictions guiding its 
application. As such, the contours of the legal development of public forum doctrine over the last 
80 years have applied to physical spaces such as parks and streets. Application to the Internet 
would require a much more nuanced discussion of the doctrine and its applicability to this 
different communication format. However, Justice Kennedy avoided any substantive discussion. 
Instead, he asserted that the internet is where “the most important places to exchange views” and 
that cyberspace is the equivalent of “the modern public square.” While this imagery is intriguing, 
it fails to actually address the nuances of the differences between the real world and the online 
world. Most disconcerting is that the Court completely disregarded the dual public and private 
nature of social media. As a result, it failed to recognize the distinction, for example, between a 
predator in an actual public park that can be seen and a predatory in the metaphorical cyber park 
who might be completely hidden or masquerading as someone of a different age or gender. 
Justice Alito alluded to this concern in his concurrence when he noted that “there are important 
differences between cyberspace and the physical word.” However, he also failed to elaborate on 
what those differences might look like in relation to application of public forum doctrine. This 
lack of nuance in applying the spatially-based doctrine onto the Internet has raised concerns by 
other scholars as well in regard to application of other doctrinal areas including fighting words63 
 
60 Jonathan Peters, “The ‘Sovereigns of Cyberspace’ and State Action: The First Amendment’s Application – or Lack Thereof – to 
Third-Party Platforms,” Berkeley Technical Law Journal 32 (2017): 1007-1008. 
61 Ibid, 1008. 
62 Enrique Armijo, “Kill Switches, Forum Doctrine, and the First Amendment’s Digital Future,” Cardoza Art and Entertainment 
Law Journal 32 (2014): 440. “We are thus left with a doctrine that protects only those speech channels that the State, in its own 
judgment, deems either sufficiently time-honored or sufficiently worthy of protection.” 
63 Barton, “Oh Snap!,” 1309. “In effect, a speaker in South Carolina or Kansas can take a photo of themselves in "blackface" 
using a Snapchat filter and send it to a targeted person in California without such speech qualifying as fighting words. In a 
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and true threats.64 Ultimately, this spatial incongruity illustrates that the Internet is not like other 
traditional media and so any doctrines developed for those media will need to be adjusted if they 
are going to be applicable in this new space. The Court in Packingham made a major misstep by 
failing to think more complexly about this situation. 
 
Problem #2: Corporate Products, not Public Forums 
 
The free speech concerns surrounding the question of who controls content on the Internet were 
alluded to in the previous section and will be expanded on the following section as well. I’ve 
singled the issue out on its own here as way to add emphasis to the importance of clearly 
identifying who has the power to control what content is permitted or restricted on the Internet. 
Much of the Internet, for example social media spaces, are not actually public forums in the legal 
sense, but are instead commercial spaces owned and operated by large corporations such as 
Facebook or Alphabet Inc., which owns, among other things, Google. Internet law scholar David 
Ardia made this point succinctly and pervasively when he wrote: “What many consider the 
largest public space in human history is not public at all.”65 It is instead a landscape “layered on 
privately owned Web sites, privately owned servers, privately owned routers, and privately 
owned backbones.”66 Kennedy does not acknowledge this fact, glossing over the ownership 
question completely. He not only equates the internet with a “modern public park,” an 
historically quintessential public space, but he also claims that social media spaces are “vast 
democratic forums.” This issue will be address in more detail later in the paper. 
 
By assigning the internet those qualities, the Court also is offering a contradictory position. On 
the one hand, if the internet is truly “a modern public park” then the government would have 
some ability to set the guidelines for the speech restrictions applied to it. On the other hand, 
given that the spaces are owned and operated by private entities, the First Amendment, which 
operates as a negative liberty, does not apply at all. By not dealing with the complexity of the 
internet as a dually public and private space, the Packingham Court not only missed an 
opportunity to begin to develop new doctrine more applicable to this type communication 
system, but has added to an already confusing situation. In other words, the Court should have 
acknowledged that “new forums for public expression are developing apart from the classic 
public square.”67 As a result of the uniqueness of the Internet as a communication medium, this 






situation such as this - where the offensiveness of the content would provoke a person to violence if not for the physical 
distance between them - the traditional fighting words doctrine is completely ill-equipped to address twenty-first century 
communication.” 
64 William Funk, “Intimidation and the Internet,” Penn State Law Review 110 (2006): 580: “…current First Amendment doctrine 
does not directly address the problem raised by the Nuremberg Files site: speech that is neither a direct threat nor an 
incitement, but nevertheless-because of its particular character, including its publication on the Internet-is intended to and 
does have the immediate effect of intimidating persons from engaging in lawful, even constitutionally protected, behavior.” 
65 David S. Ardia, “Free Speech Savior or Shield of Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 
of the Communications Decency Act,” Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 43 (2010): 377. 
66 Ibid.  
67 Peters, “Sovereigns,” 999-1000. 
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Problem #3: Frees Speech, Democracy and Corporate Motivation 
 
Finally, the Packingham ruling is adding to a body of law that is giving increasing control to the 
corporate sector to decide which speech will or will not be acceptable in the public sphere. 
Before discussing the implications of this level of corporate control, it is first essential to 
understand the neoliberal underpinnings in the Court’s ruling. The concept of neoliberalism 
arrived in the 1970s and 1980s and held at its core the idea that competitive markets combined 
with limited state intervention would solve the problems of inflation, un(der)employment and 
stagnated economic growth.68  Neoliberalism operates as ideology that privileges the market and 
conflates democracy with capitalism and freedom with consumerism.69 In connection 
specifically to mediated forms of communication, neoliberalism allows that “the newspaper 
reader, the television viewer, the radio listener are free to consumer culture as active, 
empowered, resistant audiences in a marketplace of ideas underpinned and sustained by liberal 
democratic ideology.”70 This “freedom” assumes that speech rights are best served by limited 
government involvement in speech regulation. This position holds regardless of “Whether or not 
the majority of individuals find real opportunities to exercise free speech… [and] assumes that 
governments alone, and never competitive markets, have the power to coerce.”71 The Supreme 
Court has whole-heartedly embraced this notion. It does so in part by determining which theories 
regarding social and political life are important and which ones, “such as alternative conceptions 
of liberty and equality” should be rejected.72 A 2018 study shed light on this practice by 
comparing rulings during the Warren Court Era (1953-1969) with more recent rulings in cases 
such as Citizen’s United.73 The study explained: “The Warren Court…prioritized equality over 
liberty, and thus, rationalized active legal interventions on behalf of society’s most marginalized. 
Conversely, the [later] US Supreme Court cases…reflect a rolled back version of neoliberalism 
where protecting the free speech of corporations is more important than protecting the wellbeing 
of consumers.”74 The Court’s support of neoliberalism is most notable in its continuing reliance 
on the market place of ideas rhetoric.  
 
That phrasing, which first appeared in Abrams v. United States, said that the “best test of truth is 
the power of the thought to get itself accepted into the competition of the market.”75 In other 
words, the metaphorical free speech market would operate in a similar fashion to the actual 
economic market. Since its inception in Abrams, the marketplace of ideas concept has been 
reaffirmed by the Court many times over. In Packingham, the Court relied heavily on this 
concept both by emphasizing the laissez-fair approach to government intervention and granting 
control over regulation of social media content solely to internet companies. This approach raises 
 
68 For a more in-depth look at the concept of neoliberalism, see Alfredo Saad-Filho and Deborah Johnston, Neoliberalism: A 
Critical Reader (Pluto Press, 2005). 
69 George Moinbiot, “Neoliberalism – the ideology at the root of all of our problems,” The Guardian, April 15, 2016, 
https://www.theguardian.com/books/2016/apr/15/neoliberalism-ideology-problem-george-monbiot and Christian Garland and 
Stephen Harper, “Did Somebody Say Neoliberalism?: On the Uses and Limitations of a Critical Concept in Media and 
Communication Studies,” tripleC 10, no. 2 (2012): 413.  
70 Garland, “Uses and Limitations,” 413. 
71 Stein, “Censoring Speech,” 107. 
72 David Singh Grewal and Jedediah Purdy, “Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism,” Law and Contemporary Problems 77 (2014): 
15. 
73 Winslow, “Neoliberal Conquest,” 208-214. 
74 Ibid, 214. 
75 250 U.S. 616 (1919), 630. 
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four concerns in terms of the role of media corporations who are by their very nature profit 
driven serving as free speech guardians on the internet.  
 
First, because the neoliberal approach conflates democracy with capitalism, the Court’s reliance 
on it in Packingham has serious implications for the role of the internet in supporting and 
advancing democracy. In effect, Packingham declares entities like Facebook and Google the 
“new governors” of online speech, emboldening them with the ability to set, sway and direct 
political debate.76 While in some ways similar concerns were lobbied in the past against 
mainstream broadcast media, the level of apprehension deepens in relation to the internet, 
particularly social media, because the actions of the directors or “governors” of the content are 
hidden from social media users. Justice Kennedy began the Court’s opinion by noting that “A 
fundamental principle of the First Amendment is that all person have access to places where they 
can speak and listen, and then, after reflection, speak and listen once more.”77 The reason for the 
necessity of these spaces is they are “essential venues for public gatherings to celebrate some 
views, to protest others, or simply to learn and inquire.”78 In other words, according to the Court, 
we must protect speech at the highest level in certain public spaces -- now including the Internet 
-- in order to foster open debate. However, many examples exist countering the reality of this 
perspective when applied to the Internet. The issue with presidential election tampering offers 
perhaps the most egregious illustration. Another example is the way in which Facebook actually 
determines for the user which of their “friends’” posts show up in their feed. The social media 
users are, in fact, not hearing or speaking to the audience that they think they are, thus inhibiting 
their ability to “become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any 
soapbox.”79 The soap box is instead owned by a corporation and, as a result, the town criers 
voice can only resonate in the ways in which that corporation will allow or promote. 
 
In other words, despite the assertion by the Court in Packingham, Internet platforms are not 
necessarily the best stewards of democratic participation. By giving them this role, the Court has 
in effect given the companies free reign in “developing a de facto free speech jurisprudence.”80 
Announcing the corporate owners as the “sovereigns of cyberspace”81 leads to a second concern 
raised as a result of the Packingham ruling. In terms of First Amendment law, private entities, 
such as Facebook or Google, do not have to follow the same rules concerning content restriction 
that the government does. Government entities, when choosing to restrict speech in a public 
forum, must abide by the rule of content neutrality. Either the law must be content neutral or the 
government must prove a substantial need for the restrictions. Corporations do not need to follow 
either of those guidelines. The Court in Packingham concluded that for the government “to 
foreclose access to social media altogether is to prevent the user from engaging in the legitimate 
exercise of First Amendment rights.”82 However, Internet platform providers are exercising their 
abilities to engage in the prevention of users from posting certain content. The examples of this 
behavior run the gambit from Facebook removing the videos posted to her page by Korryn 
 
76 Kate Klonick, “The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing On-line Speech,” Harvard Law Review 131 
(2018): 1603. 
77 Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S.Ct. 1730, 1732. 
78 Ibid, 1735. 
79 Ibid, 1737. 
80 Peters, “Sovereigns,” 991. 
81 Ibid, 993. 
82 Packingham, 1737. 
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Gaines before she was shot and killed by Maryland police to Twitter banning conservative 
spokespersons Milo Yiannoploulos and Alex Jones to Facebook deleting a user’s account due to 
the posting of a famous nude painting. While it is open to debate whether some material, such as 
hate speech, should be regulated on the media, it should not be left up to corporations to decide 
which content is acceptable and which is not. This practice runs counter to a commitment to free 
speech and open public discourse.  
 
The third concern raised ties directly to the problem of allowing companies to make decisions 
about speech restrictions with little to no government oversight. Social media sites are owned by 
highly profitable corporations. For example, Facebook brought in $16.6 billion in ad revenue in 
the second quarter of 2019 and its CEO Mark Zuckerberg has a net worth of approximately $55 
billion. Because corporations are money making entities, their decision-making process is likely 
to be driven by profit, not public good. They are more likely to make their decisions about user 
generated content based on the bottom line instead of the citizen’s right to engage in open public 
discourse. Presidential hopeful Elizabeth Warren noted: “America’s big tech companies provide 
valuable products but also wield enormous power over our digital lives. Nearly half of all e-
commerce goes through Amazon. More than 70 percent of all Internet referral traffic goes through 
sites owned or operated by Google or Facebook.”83 Her assessment is being wrestled with by 
legal scholars. Some have employed neoliberal arguments to promote the position that platform 
owners are no less capable of creating speech policies for the Internet than government agencies 
would be. Those scholars contend that the corporations have a financial incentive to uphold 
democratic values.  
 
Kate Klonick proclaimed these companies to be one component of a new tri-part communication 
system that places platform owners in the middle between the state and speakers-publishers.84 
She found that the platforms are “economically and normatively driven to reflect the democratic 
culture and free speech expectations of their users,” and as a result they will “moderate content 
because of a foundation in American free speech norms, corporate responsibility, and the 
economic necessity of creating an environment that reflects the expectations of their users.”85 
Hasen also proposed that non-governmental actors, rather than courts and governments, are “in 
the best position to ameliorate some of the darker effects of [what he calls] cheap speech.”86 
However, he added the caveat that those companies will need “a commercial reason to do so” 
and he conceded that  “it is not clear whether Facebook and Google will go far enough, 
especially given the market dominance each holds over social media and search markets 
respectively.”87 These neoliberal arguments reproduce sentiments that have been made in terms 
of corporations in other areas of the business world, such as the environment and health care, for 
decades and they ignore the fact that the arguments didn’t hold true in those areas either. What 
happens if, as Hasen alludes to, there is no market pressure? Or, what if the market pressure 
driven by the majority is detrimental to non-majority members? Prominent legal scholar Richard 
Delgado broached this question in relation to the proliferation of hate speech on the Internet and 
concluded that “…organizations that run the Internet, including Google, Microsoft, Facebook, 
 
83 Elizabeth Warren, “Here’s How We Can Break Up Big Tech,” in Medium https://medium.com/@teamwarren/heres-how-we-
can-break-up-big-tech-9ad9e0da324c. 
84 Klonick, “New Governors,” 1602. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Hasen, “Cheap Speech,” 202.  
87 Ibid.  
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and Twitter, are unlikely to take forceful and continuing action against hate speech, at least 
without firm public pressure.”88 In addition, even if Facebook or Google decided to make what 
they determine to be restrictions grounded in society’s best interest, why do they become arbiters 
of what the majority of the citizenry wants? How will they determine, for example, what 
constitutes regulable hate speech or obscenity? These questions were also ignored by the Court. 
 
The fourth concern emerging from the Packingham ruling in relation to corporate control is one 
of practicality of application. Even if we could concede that Internet providers are at least as 
competent, if not better suited, to deal with content issues on the Internet, there still exists the 
complication of multiple Internet platform owners each making their own rules. As one legal 
scholar noted: “…relying on private companies to develop proprietary solutions will only create 
a patchwork of protections that vary in strength and effectiveness.”89 This ad hoc approach could 
lead to some content being restricted on one site but allowed on another and, as a result, could 
exacerbate the mystery already in place around how, why and when those companies choose to 
block or remove content. In addition, Justice Kennedy made special note in his opinion about the 
power and newness of the Internet and its role in society. He cautioned that it is “so new, so 
protean, and so far-reaching that courts must be conscious that what they say today might be 
obsolete tomorrow.”90 I think that his caution might have best been extended to allowing what 




Twenty years’ worth of lower court opinions and scholarly analysis of the role of the internet in 
modern society did not stop the Court in Packingham from simply reproducing the same lack of 
finesse that the Court did in Reno in 1997. Despite stating that “the Courts must exercise extreme 
caution,” the majority then went on to pen an opinion that was anything but cautious. And, in a 
similar vein of the Reno ruling, Packingham again applied a doctrine, this time public forum 
doctrine, to a medium that bears little actual resemblance to a traditional public forum. One 
could go so far as to argue that the ruling in Packingham is even more problematic as the internet 
has grown exponentially in the past 20 years.  
 
By incorrectly identifying the Internet as akin to a public park, the Court has ushered in possible 
long-term and highly detrimental consequences. Overall, the suggestion of the neoliberal 
solution of allowing the corporate sector to uphold and champion societal norms in the best 
interested of society is high problematic in the area of speech just as it has been in other areas in 
the past. In addition, the Court’s lack of any real assessment of the Internet as a public forum for 
First Amendment purposes is bound to lead to confusion among the lower courts and will be 
compounded as we move past the specific law in question in Packingham to a broader 
application in cases dealing with topics such as fake news, hate speech, or government-




88 Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, “Hate Speech in Cyberspace,” Wake Forest Law Review 49 (2014): 327-328. 
89 Emanuelson, “Fake Left, Fake Right,” 223. 
90 Packingham, 1732. 
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